FEATURE: Why is Yemen Important to Saudi Arabia? A Geopolitical Analysis (PART TWO)

This article is a continuation of the previous similarly named article on the same topic, which outline the geopolitical importance of Yemen to Saudi Arabia. 

The Red Sea

However, it is not only Yemen’s land borders which are of importance to Saudi Arabia, with Yemen’s position on the sea of equally vital importance to the economic security of the House of Saud. Perhaps Yemen’s most geopolitically important factor is her position in regard to the Bab-al-Mandab Strait, which acts as a strategic chokepoint between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. The Strait is approximately twenty miles wide, with the Yemeni island of Perim dividing the already narrow strait into two channels. The strait is thus vulnerable, while being highly important, as nearly 9 percent of the world’s total seaborne-traded oil and refined products travel through the Strait year-on-year. From Yemeni ports, any power hostile to Saudi Arabia would have the potential to disrupt Saudi trade, with the ports, military and naval bases of Hodiedah, Perim and Aden of particular strategic value.

The Houthi Threat to the Saudi Heartland

Intensely traversed shipping lanes from the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean coalesce around the Red Sea, while the output of a large portion of Saudi oil departs from the port of Jeddah. Houthi forces have recognised the fragility of Saudi trade links, seeking to disrupt said trade through terrorist attacks, damaging their Saudi adversaries economy, while bringing world attention to the battleground of Yemen. Houthi attacks began with rocket-propelled grenades, before advancing to C-802 anti-ship missiles (likely acquired from Iran) and even suicide drone boats. Fifteen strikes in 2018 came in the Bab-al-Mandab Strait, before the Saudi advance on Hodiedah disrupted the Houthi ability to organise attacks, with the Houthi’s now resorting to the laying of mines to indiscriminately disrupt and damage shipping. Indeed, Houthi political council chief, Saleh al Samad  recognised the importance of the Strait to Saudi Arabia and the wider world, threatening to block the Strait; stating ‘that if the political solution hits a wall, there are some strategic choices that will be taken… including blocking the international navigation in the Red Sea’. Hence when Saudi intervention began in 2015, it became a key objective to secure the positions around Yemen’s coastline. Perim and Aden fell easily enough to the Saudi coalition, as these were relatively flat areas, dominated locally by Sunni populations hostile to the Shias (who make up roughly 55% and 45% of Yemen’s population respectively). Yet Hodiedah has become a battle ground, with the Saudi coalition unable to dominate the port whilst managing to effectively disable the Houthi’s ability to block the strait. Maintaining the freedom of navigation across the Bab-al-Mandab Strait and Red Sea is now a key geopolitical imperative for Saudi Arabia.

Demographic Contention

While Saudi Arabia’s largest Shia population is situated near Bahrain, its second largest population (and most highly concentrated) is around the border provinces of Nasir and Jizan (largely of the Ismaili denomination). These regions border the Sarawat Mountains, where the Houthi Shias of Yemen reside, as does the mountain capital of Sanaa. The domination of a Houthi state over the Sunni populace as a potential proxy-client of Iran was a key motivation in the MBS initiated intervention of 2015. Whereas a Shia led regime in Bahrain could accord Iran a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, Bahrain is a small, flat island, with a tiny native population (around 1.5 million). Yemen on the other hand has a population of nearly 29 million, while being over 690 times larger, with formidable mountains, strategic ports and an extensive, porous border with Saudi Arabia. To have a hostile state of this size, supplied and financed by Iran (as demonstrated by several Iranian weapon caches being intercepted during the Houthi conflict) is an unacceptable situation for Riyadh. Firstly because it could act as a potential theatre of conflict if the cold war in the region was ever to turn hot, but secondly because the Shia Houthi state could act as a financer to disrupt the Ismaili Shia’s in Saudi Arabia. This could precipitate or at least have the potential to facilitate a domestic insurgency in the Hejaz, home to key economic centres as well as the religious cities of Mecca and Medina. While Saudi Arabia has invested upwards of $20 billion annually in attempt to destroy Houthi power, the rebels remain entrenched within the Sarawat mountains, dragging the conflict into a seemingly endless stalemate that acts as a drain on Saudi resources. Thus, while Saudi intervention has largely failed in its aims to dislodge the Houthis, it has at the very least prevented the consolidation of Houthi or Iranian power in the peninsula, which remains a matter of importance even as weariness over the conflict in Riyadh increases.

Conclusion

Thus, for all of the reasons outline in this and the previous article, it can become clear that Saudi intervention in Yemen is not conducted on a whim. There are very real geopolitical reasons for the intervention, even if the intervention itself has failed to dislodge the Houthi's and install a friendly regime. Nonetheless, this failure does not change the geopolitical facts that attract Riyadh to Yemen. Indeed, though Saudi troops may leave Yemen and its air force cease its raids, Saudi Arabia will continue to keep a fierce watch upon its southern neighbour.

A Religious Map of Yemen (Percentages are Approximates).