FEATURE (Part Three): Ukraine: Attempting to Escape Russia's Grasp (A Geopolitical Analysis)

 Welcome to the final of the three part feature on Ukraine and its geopolitical relationship with Russia. This final article details the issues within the Black Sea, as well as with the export of Russian energy. To catch up on the previous features, please click the links below:

Part One: https://mundusreport.blogspot.com/2021/11/feature-part-one-ukraine-attempting-to.html

Part Two: https://mundusreport.blogspot.com/2021/11/feature-part-two-ukraine-attempting-to.html

The Importance of the Black Sea

The final asset of Ukrainian geography of importance to Russia, is its large coastlines on the Black Sea and more specifically, the Crimean Peninsula. Home to a majority Russian-ethnic population (owing to Soviet era deportations of native Tatars and a consequent Russian settlement plan), the Crimean Peninsula is important from both a security and economic standpoint. Economically, the Crimea presents deep, warm-water ports that operate all year round (most notably Sevastopol), increasing Russian trade. Equally, the Crimea protects the Sea of Azov (particularly so since the development of the Crimea Bridge by Russia in 2018, that is deliberately low clearance to act as a barrier to large vessels), in to which the important Don and Kuban rivers feed. The Don is particularly important economically, as it is commercially navigable deep into Russia’s heartland and is the busiest trade river in southern Russia.

Equally, the Crimea is vital for Russia’s security. Sevastopol, as well as its commercial assets (and indeed its emotional significance as a key battle ground in the Crimean and Second World Wars) serves as the base for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, whose lease from the Ukrainians was due to end in 2017 and as a result, annexing the peninsula in 2014 permanently allowed the continuation of Russian sea power, which is vital to the security of southern Russia. Indeed, Russian anti-air and sea fortifications now situated in Crimea imperil any amphibious assault across the Black Sea, preventing the region that was once termed ‘Russia’s soft underbelly’, from being penetrated by hostile naval powers as during the Crimean War. Finally, the control of the Crimea and thus the Azov Sea contribute to Russia’s internal security, with the aforementioned Kuban river connecting Russia’s diverse and often separatist-minded Caucuses provinces to the Black Sea, strengthening Moscow’s hold over any would-be separatists. In turn, the acquisition of Crimea was vital to Moscow’s geopolitical objectives, with economic and security-based imperatives at risk if the Crimea were to drift into NATO’s or even the EU’s orbit.

Energy Issues

Perhaps even more important (at least formerly) for Russia was the position of Ukraine regarding Russian energy exports, particularly for President Putin’s early legitimacy which initially relied heavily on the boon that energy exports provided towards national finances in the early 2000s. Of the three central lines delivering energy to Europe from Russia in the mid2000s, two stretched across Ukraine (namely the Soyuz and Brotherhood pipelines), making Ukraine’s co-operation essential to Russian hydrocarbon exports and indeed the transit fees were equally vital to Ukraine’s fragile economy. However, the 2014 crisis resulted in a splitting of ways, as Ukraine weened itself off Russian economic dependency as Russia simultaneously developed the Nord and South Stream pipelines to avoid Ukrainian territory. These developments left Western and Central Europe shockingly vulnerable to Russian energy exports, a reality the Europeans recognised even before the annexation of Crimea.

 A potential solution for the Europeans (and a vulnerability to the Russians) to this came in the form of Georgia. Caucasian energy (particularly from Azerbaijan) is a key alternative to Russian supply, but one that is fraught with risk when attempting to reach the key European market. If attempting to avoid Russia, Georgia is the most viable transit route for Caspian energy. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict blocks Armenian routes, Kurdish insurgents have been known to attack Turkish pipelines and any deviation eastwards through Iran, Afghanistan or other Central Asian states are arguably even more problematic than Russia, due to their frayed records on human rights and bad relations with the West. Thus, Georgia is geographically placed to capitalise on this (particularly since the 2003 Rose revolution, wherein Georgia became a youthful democracy). In turn, this raises the stakes for Russia in regard to Georgia, as it attempts to ensure the continued Russian monopoly on energy exports to Europe. Hence while Ukrainian transit points were formerly of importance, now it is important for Russia geopolitically to recognise the Georgian potential of becoming a problematic transit state for rival energy exports.

Conclusions

Thus, across all three articles, I have attempted to illustrate the importance of Ukraine to Russia, through a geopolitical angle. There is often an intersection of fields, but the rawest component of Russian attraction to Ukraine is in geography. What outcomes may arise between the two states is yet to be seen, but Russia, particularly under Putin, is determined to not allow Kiev to slip out of its grasp any time soon. 

(Source: https://www.sipri.org/news/2019/sipri-informs-black-sea-security)